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The Bomb Thief and the Theory of 
Justification Defenses* 
Paul H. Robinson** 
I s a justification defense, such as self-defense, law enforcement authority, or lesser evil, given because of an actor's good motive--his 
justificatory purpose--for doing what otherwise would be an offense? 
Or, is a justification defense given because, given the special justifying 
circumstances, the law tolerates and even encourages the actor's conduct? 
The answer to these questions has implications for how justification 
defenses are formulated. The bomb thief case nicely illustrates the 
tension between these two ways of characterizing the justification defense, 
and helps illustrate why one theory is better than the other. 
I. THE BOMB THIF.I~ 
Motti Ashkenazi, a thin, almost gaunt-looking man from a poor, crime- 
ridden South Tel Aviv neighborhood, is strolling along a crowded 
Jerusalem beach between Tel Aviv and Jaffa on a hot Friday afternoon 
© Paul H. Robinson 1998. This artide will be published in Hebrew by the 
Td Aviv University Faculty of Law in I.rune/M/shpa~ Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar. 1998). 
Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois, 
United States; B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1970; J.D., University of California 
at Los Angeles 1973; LL.M., Harvard University 1975; Dip. Leg. Stud., Cambridge 
University 1976. 
388 Criminal Law Forum Vol. 8 No. 3 
in June 1997. A drug addict and petty thief who only a week ago had 
been arrested after bungling a car burglary, Ashkenazi has been thinking 
for a while about getting off drugs and putting his life together. But the 
going has been tough even with the support of his family. 
As he walks, he sees that someone has left a black backpack 
unattended in an open area by the sidewalk. The 30-year-old Ashkenazi 
looks around but sees no one watching. He picks up the backpack and 
quickly sneaks off, pleased by his good fortune. Without opening the 
backpack to inspect his loot, he walks down nearby Geula Street to a 
rundown apartment building and slips inside. There in the stairwell, he 
unzips the backpack. Inside he sees a clock with wires connected to a 
cookie tin, with loose nails surrounding the contraption. Ashkenazi 
quickly realizes he just stole a bomb. 
Panicked but in control, he runs into the nearby Savoy Hotel 
and rushes up to the reception desk. He tells the clerk what he found 
and the clerk calls the Tel Aviv police. The bomb squad arrives in 
minutes and starts trying to deactivate the bomb in the apartment 
building stairwell. Meanwhile, Ashkenazi stands outside the building, 
keeping the street clear of passersby and warning a group of children to 
stay away. The bomb squad finds that the bomb is packed with nearly 
3 kilograms of explosives. They successfully neutralize it. Police officers 
search the beach for more bombs but find none. 
At first, Ashkenazi lies to the police and tells them he found the 
backpack in the apartment building stairwell, where he had gone to 
urinate, but later confesses to having stolen the backpack. Considering 
the amount of explosives and the number of people in the area where the 
bomb was left, police estimate that the bomb would have killed many 
people in a major terrorist attack, t 
This factual account is based on Raine Marcus, Petty ThiqC's "Good Deed" Saves 
Lives on Crowded TelAviv Beach, Jerusalem Post, June 22, 1997; Arutz Sheva, Stealing 
a B&rt; June 22, 1997 (Judean Voice News and Commentary computer bulletin board 
posting); Dod Lebia, First Time in My Life That I Went to the Police without Handcuj~, 
Ma'ariv, June 23, 1997; Buki Na'eh & Efin Navon, Someumes Cn'me Can Pay Off[, 
Ma'ariv, June 23, 1997; Erin Navon, Reveals Bomb, Starts Rehab, Ma'ariv, June 23, 1997; 
Chana Kaytm, The Luck of Motti Ashkenazi, Ha'Arets, June 23, 1997; Reuvan Shapira, 
Addict Took a Bag on the Tel Aviv Beach, Found a Bomb Inside, and Alerted the Police, 
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What criminal Liability should Ashkenazi have for the theft of the 
backpack, if any? Ashkenazi's conduct constitutes theft; he has taken 
another's property without the owner's permission. All jurisdictions and 
scholars agree that, if he had known at the time of the offense what he 
discovered later--that the bag contained a terrorist bomb--he  dearly 
would have been justified in taking the bag. Indeed, his knowing of the 
actual circumstances would have made his conduct not just justified but 
heroic. Of  what effect is the fact that he did not know that his taking 
the bag was justified, that he in fact thought he was committing theft? 
Should he be liable for theft, which he thought he was committing? Or, 
should he be exempt from liability became his act, while it normally 
would have caused a net harm, in this instance caused a net benefit, 
probably saving many lives? 
These questions flame an ongoing dispute in criminal law theory 
over the nature of justification defenses. Is a justification defense given 
because the actor's deed in fact avoids a greater harm, the deeds theory of 
justification, or because of the actor's reason for acting, his justificatory 
purpose, the reasons theory? 
In most cases of justification, both theories are satisfied: the 
justifying circumstances exist; the actor knows of them and performs the 
offense conduct because of them. She performs the right deed for the 
right reason. But in two kinds of cases, the two theories conflict: 
mistake as to a justification and an unknowingly justified actor. 
Where an actor mistakenly believes she is justified, the reasons 
theory would give a justification defense--for it is only the actor's 
subjective intent that matters--while the deeds theory would deny a 
justification defense. But this conflict between the theories ends 
primarily in a labeling dispute. The actor denied a justification defense 
under the deeds theory nonetheless will be exculpated trader an excuse 
defense for her mistake as to a justification, assuming the mistake is 
reasonable. 
The reverse case, where an actor mistakenly believes that she is 
not justified, act~3ally gives different liability results under the two 
theories. An unknowingly justified actor has no defense under the 
Ha'Arets, June 22, 1997; Interview byJon Van Samek with Raine Marcus, Jerusalem Post 
reporter (July 22, 1997). 
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reasons theory, with its subjective focus, for she believed her conduct was 
unjustified. Under the deeds theory, in contrast, her conduct will be 
justified, because the deeds theory looks to the objective nature of the 
conduct. The unknowingly justified actor would be liable at most for 
trying to act unjustifiably--what I will argue later is a standard form of 
impossible attempt. Thus, while the reasons theory imposes liability for 
the full substantive offense, the deeds theory imposes only the reduced 
liability of attempt. 
It is for this reason that the case of Motfi Ashkenazi, the bomb 
thief--perhaps the cleanest case available of the unknowingly justified 
actor-- is  so interesting and so important. In an earlier article, I argued 
in support of the deeds theory. 2 This brief essay tests the theory and its 
implications in the real world. 
II. CURRENT LAW GOVERNING 
THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIFIF.D ACTOR 
Most, but not all, American state criminal codes appear to follow the 
reasons theory, although the apparent clarity of first appearances does not 
always survive dose inspection. 3 The American Law Institute's Model 
Penal Code uses a reasons formulation in its justification defenses: an 
actor is justified "if she believes that her conduct is necessary for defense. 4 
Current English law also appears to adopt the reasons theory. Smith and 
Hogan, for example, conclude that English law "is stated exclusively in 
2 In this essay I attempt only to summarize the central arguments made there. 
For a full discussion, see Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories offiatification: Deeds vs. 
Reasom, in Harm and Culpability 45 (A. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996). 
3 At least one American jurisdiction formulates all of its justification defenses in 
a purely objective form. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-01 et seq. For a list of jurisdic- 
tions that have at least one objective justification statute, see 2 Paul H. Robinson, 
Cr/m/na/Law DqCenses ~ 122 n.19 (1984). 
4 E.g:, Model Penal Code §§ 3.02(1), 3.03(3)(a), 3.04(1), 3.05(1)(b), 3.06(1), 
3.o7(1). 
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terms of  the defendant's belief, ''5 citing the cases of  Gladstone Williams, 
Dadson, and Thain. 6 O n  the other hand, section 24 of  the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, appears to be an exception to the general 
rule, for it justifies an arrest even if the officer did not at the time know 
of  or believe in the justifying circumstances, 7 reflecting a deeds theory of  
justification. Clauses 44 and 185 of  the proposed Criminal Code for 
England and Wales appear to broaden this exception to make it the 
general rule. That  is, they would have the law adopt a deeds theory as 
its general approach. The  Draft Code provides a justification defense if 
the actor "uses such force as, in the circumstances which exist," is 
immediately necessary and reasonable for defense, s Interestingly, the 
drafters claim that the provision codifies the c o m m o n  law of  self-defense 
and defense of  another. 9 They  concede that it modifies the common  law 
of  defense of  property, but  argue that such is necessary to avoid an 
irrational inconsistency between the rules for the defense of  property and 
person. 1° Israeli law appears to adopt the deeds theory. Sections 34J 
and 34K of the Israeli Penal Law, self-defense and necessity, respectively, 
s J.C Smith & Brian Hogan, Cr/m/na/Law 245 (6th ed. 1988). 
6 G/adstone W////arm, [1984] 78 Cr. App. R. 276; Dadsor~ [1850] 4 Cox C.C. 
358; Tha/n, [1985] 11 NI 31. 
7 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 24(4)(a), (5)(a), (7)(a) (providing 
that an actor may arrest without a warrant "anyone who is guilty of the offence" or words 
to that effect). 
8 A Criminal Code fbr England and Wales, Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill 
61, 100 (1989) [hereinafter Draft Code]. The Draft Code also provides a defense if the 
actor "uses such force as, in the circumstances . . . which he believes to exist," is 
immediately necessary and reasonable for defense. This does not make the provision one 
based upon a reasons theory of justification. Nothing in the deeds theory prohibits a de- 
fense for mistake as to a justification. On the contrary, it assumes that such a defense 
will be provided but will be understood to be an excuse. Note that this provision of the 
Draft Code does not identify either defense as a justification or an excuse. 
9 The drafters explain: "[I]fhis de.fence is that he was defending his person, or 
that of another, the test at common law is whether what he did was reasonable." A 
Criminal Code j~r England and Wales, Comnm~tary on Draft Criminal Code Bill § 12.25, 
at 231 (1989) (emphasis added). 
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are both formulated in purely objective terms, thereby giving a defense 
to the unknowingly justified actor. II 
Most academic writers have signed on in support of the reasons 
t h e o ry  and in opposition to the deeds theory,  I2 s o m e  suggesting that the 
latter is "absurd, ''I3 unfair ,  14 or  unduly burdensome3 5 
HI. DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE PROPER LIABII.ITY 
FOR THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIF~.D ACTOR 
Recall the differing results from the two theories. The reasons theory 
gives no justification defense because the actor does not believe that the 
u Israeli Penal Law (573711977) (A.G. Feb. 1996). Some writers dispute this 
interpretation. 
12 E.g:, Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of  Excuses, 82 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 465, 489 (1991) (arguing that state of mind is a necessity and that 
Robinson's externalist perception is impossible to accep0; Kent Greenawalt, The Perp/ex- 
ing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 144 (1984) (recognizing that 
most modem statutes require a subjective belief in justification and that Robinson's fully 
objective approach is an exception); Wayne LaFave & Austin Scott, Jr., Substantive 
Cr/m/na/Law 685 (1986) (claiming that in order to have the benefit of justification one 
must act for that particular purpose); Smith & Hogan, supra note 5, at 37 (requiting 
state of mind as well as state of fact for justification is certainly reasonable). 
13 "It seems to me absurd to say that I mayjust/~ or excuse my conduct, however 
callous it was in the circumstances known to me at the time, by showing that there 
existed other circumstances which, had I but known of them, would have justified or 
excused my conduct." Brian Hogan, TheDadson Principle, 1989 Crim. L. Rev. 679, 680 
(emphasis in original). 
14 Arnold Loewy, Culpa~'~y, Dangeroumess, and Harrm Balancing the Factors on 
Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L Rev. 283, 289 (1988) (arguing that, 
as a matter of fairness, the issue ought to be one solely of culpability rather than resul0. 
15 "[A] purdy objective view of self-defense.., is a more difficult factual question 
for the defendant to resolve than the question of her own subjective belief since 
calculation of the harm threatened involves a number of variables [which] are beyond the 
defendant's ability to perceive." Kevin McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guiky 
Plea Process, 40 Hastings LJ. 957, 979 (1989) (emphasis in original). 
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justifying circtmmtances exist. Whether the circumstances actually exist 
or not is irrdevant. Thus, Ashkenazi's theft is not justified even though 
it was necessary for the protection of other persons' lives. Ashkenazi's rea- 
son for acting was wrong; that his deed was in fact objectively justified 
is irrelevant. Under the deeds theory, in contrast, the actual nature of the 
deed is central: Ashkenazi would receive a justification defense even 
though he did not realize at the time that his conduct was objectively 
justified. As discussed more fully below, in Section III.C, however, he 
nonetheless may be liable for an attempt, and thereby receive some, 
albeit reduced, liability. 
JL Disagreement over the Sign~ance of Result'rig Harm 
It may be that this disagreement over the proper liability level for the 
unknowingly justified actor is simply a manifestation of a larger dispute 
going beyond the nature of justification defenses. The grading disagree- 
ment may be simply another battleground in the dispute over the 
significance of resulting harm. Those who believe that the criminal law 
ought to focus on conduct and culpable state of mind alone, and that 
the fortuity of resulting harm ought not affect liability, will naturally 
prefer the result of the reasons theory. Their view is that only the actor's 
subjective state of mind should matter to liability. That the unknowing- 
ly justified actor believes that his conduct is unjustified is enough in itself 
to impose full liability, they would argue, just as the person who thinks 
he has bought illegal drugs or believes he has lit a fuse on dynamite 
sticks ought to be fully liable even if it turns out that the powder is 
talcum and the dynamite sticks are wooden. The Model Penal Code, for 
one, seems to take this view when it adopts a rule that generally punishes 
attempts to the same extent as the substantive offense. 16 
If  this is the reason for one's support of a reasons theory of 
justification, then there is little more to be said on the liability issue. 
Even if one were to adopt a deeds theory, which gives only attempt 
16 Model Penal Code ~ 5.05(1). In reality, however, the code does not adopt a 
view that rejects the significance of resulting harrrL See inj~a text accompanying notes 
1%25; see also Paul H. Robinson, The Ro/e of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law: A Study 
in Legislative Decefltion?, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 299 (1994). 
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liability, under such a pure subjectivist approach attempts would be 
graded the same as the substantive offense, thereby erasing any difference 
in the liability results between the theories. Thus, pure subjectivists (i.e., 
those believing resulting harm ought to be irrelevant to liability) can skip 
to the next section. They will find there that the community disagrees 
with their view of the significance of resulting harm, as well as with their 
view that the unknowingly justified thief ought to be punished the same 
as the unjustified thief. They also will be interested in Section V, which 
points out the problem their theory presents in the context of rules 
governing resistance to an unknowingly justified actor. 
Further, as I have argued at  length elsewhere, there are other 
important reasons beyond liability results for preferring the conceptual 
scheme and terminology of the deeds theory, t7 Only the deeds concep- 
t-alization of justification allows the law dearly to identify, with the label 
"justified," conduct that it condones and will tolerate by others in similar 
situations in the future. The reasons conceptuali?ation, by including 
under the same label both justified conduct and mistake as to a justifi- 
cation, frustrates this important ex ante function of law. Conduct per- 
formed under a mistaken belief it is justified is not conduct the law 
wishes to signal as approved in similar circumstances in the future. In 
fact, it wishes to signal the opposite, that such conduct is to be avoided 
in the future. By combining both objectively justified conduct and mis- 
taken justification under the same label, "justified," the law hides this 
important distinction. Under the reasons approach, then, case adjudica- 
tions in which the defendant is acquitted as "justified" obscure and con- 
fuse the public as to the rules of conduct rather than clarify and educate. 
On these grounds, even the pure subjectivist may conclude that a deeds 
theory of justification is preferable. 
Whatever the logical appeal of the pure subjectivist view, it is a 
view that exists (and will probably always exist) only in academia. The 
empirical study reported in Section IV is one of many that confirm a 
nearly universal view among lay persons that, in their intuitive notions 
of justice, resulting harm does matter, ts I know of no jurisdiction that 
,7 Robinson, supra note 2, at 6 1 - 6 7 .  
m See also Paul H. Robinson & Jolm M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: 
Community Hews and the Criminal Law 1, 17 (1995). 
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a~=l ly  takes a pure subjectivist view, whatever code drafters may say 
they prefer. All American jurisdictions, even many of those adopting the 
Model Penal Code, reject that code's notion that attempts should be 
punished the same as the substantive offense. Even the Model Penal 
Code itself is ambivalent in its apparent commitment to a pure 
subjectivist view. It creates an exception for attempts to commit a first- 
degree felony, such as murder. Thus, attempted murder is graded less 
than murder) 9 More important, if the code really believed in the pure 
subjectivist view, it would drop all result elements from its offenses, as 
irrelevant to liability. In fact, it commonly defines offenses as containing 
a result element. 2° Further, the Model Penal Code drafters selected the 
most demanding, traditional definition of causation, the necessary cause 
("but for") test. 21 If the drafters truly were unabashed subjecfivists, they 
would at the very least have adopted a weaker causation test, perhaps a 
sufficient cause test (as was proposed during the American Law Institute 
floor debate on the causation section). 22 If results ought to be irrelevant 
but for some unpleasant reason must be maintained, would not the 
drafters at least want to make it as easy as possible to satisfy those 
irrelevant result requirements? 
It may be that the Model Penal Code drafters grudgingly added 
result elements to offense definitions and adopted the strong, necessary 
cause test of causation, because they thought the public would demand 
it of their criminal law. z3 But this only concedes that the pure sub- 
,9 Model Penal Code § 5.05(1). 
20 E.g:, /d §§ 210.1 (Criminal Homicide--"causes the death"), 211.1 (As- 
sault--"causes bodily injury to another"), 220.2(1) (Causing Catastrophe--"person who 
causes a catastrophe"). 
z, /d ~ 2.03(1)(a). 
22 American Law Institute, Floor Debate on Model Penal Code ~ 2.03(1)(a), 
A.I-I. Proc. 77-79, 135-39 (1962) (proposing that the actor's conduct be only "a 
substantial factor in producing the result"). 
z3 See, e.o~, Model Penal Code § 2.03 comment 257 (1985) ("when severe 
sanctions are involved..,  it cannot be expected that jurors will lightly return verdicts 
leading to severe sentences in the absence of the resentment aroused by the infliction of 
serious injuries"). 
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jectivist view of criminal law is one that cannot be sold to those who are 
to be governed by that law. 24 To insist on a pure subjectivist view would 
be to undercut the criminal law's moral authority with the public, which 
in turn would endanger the law's effectiveness. 25 
Israeli Penal Law section 27 grades attempts in a way that is 
similar in some respects to that of the Model Penal Code. It allows 
judges to impose the same penalty for an attempt as for the substantive 
offense, which might be taken to suggest a pure subjectivist view. But 
the section exempts attempts from any mandatory or minimum penalty 
that would apply to the substantive offense. The true subjectivist would 
provide no such exemption, of course, for the exemption concedes that 
attempts are different from the substantive offense in an important way, 
a way that suggests a liability discount is appropriate where the harm 
does not come about. In practice, under section 27, a judge may 
provide a substantial reduction in all attempt cases. The empirical 
evidence presented in Section IV, below, suggests the community would 
prefer such a reduction. Thus, if judges concur in the community view, 
they will follow such a practice. The only effect of section 27, then, is 
to take away the traditional provision that set the maximum penalty for 
attempt at less than that for the substantive offense. Given how rarely 
offenders are sentenced to the statutory maximum, section 27 may be of 
little effect. 26 
Nor can one take the provision as a symbolic commitment to the 
pure subjectivist view. For, if that were the drafters' intention, there 
would be no reason for them to retain the result elements of offense 
definitions. 27 If every substantive offense and attempt deserve the same 
,4 See generally Robinson, supra note 16. 
25 For a full discussion of this point, see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
The Utili O, of Desert; 91 Nw. U. L Rev. 453 (1997). 
26 Perhaps its primary purpose is to give the pure subjectivist academics a sense 
that their view is not being ignored. 
~7 Another reason to be skeptical of the idea that the Israeli Penal Law takes a 
pure subjectivist view is found in the objective formulation of justification defenses, in 
§§ 34J and 34K, noted above. The only effect of having art objective formulation is to 
give a defense to the unknowingly justified actor--that is, to take account of the fact 
that he has caused no net harrm If resulting harm is irrdevant--the pure subjectivist 
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punishment upon the same conduct and culpable state of mind, on what 
ground does the law retain a result element in substantive offenses? At 
best, one can conclude that the Israeli Penal Law leaves the issue of the 
significance of resulting harm to sentencing judges. 
Given this, as well as the Model Penal Code's ambivalence on 
the same issue, it is worth considering the implications for the unknow- 
ingly justified actor of a world where it is conceded that resulting harm 
does matter to liability. 
B. The UnknounMgly Just i~d Actor in a Worm Where Resulting 
Harm Matters 
If we assume, as the world we know does, that resulting harm ought to 
increase liability, what theory of justification is preferable? If~people 
generally think that resulting harm should matter to liability, why do so 
many writers and code drafters seem to prefer the reasons theory of 
justification? If state code drafters routinely reject the manifestations of 
the pure subjectivist view, as in rejecting the Model Penal Code call for 
grading attempts the same as the complete offense, why would they not 
also reject the code's subjective formulation of justification defenses? Is 
this simply the product of an untidy world, where the minority 
subjectivist view is adopted in the formulation of justification defenses 
simply because the state code drafters do not see the connection between 
the issues of subjectivist attempt grading and subjectivist justification 
formulations? In short, probably yes. 
If a jurisdiction admits the significance of resulting harm in 
assessing liability, if resulting harm may give rise to greater liability than 
no resulting harm, it seems difficult to see how a jurisdiction can reject 
the deeds theory of justification, which gives attempt liability to the 
unknowingly justified actor, in favor of the reasons theory, which ignores 
view--why would the Penal Law adopt the objective formulation? Indeed, one may 
wonder about the internal inconsistency of a code that adopts an objective formulation 
of justification defenses, then makes specific statutory provision to allow judges to grade 
an attempt the same as the substantive offense. As a matter of general principle, resulting 
harm is either relevant to the amount of punishment or it is not. Under what theory 
could the unknowingly justified actor be entided to a dlscount--the effect of the 
objective justification formulation--but the attempter not? 
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the fact that the conduct in reality causes no net harm. The actor may 
have thought he or she was causing a net societal harm but be surprised 
to find that no such net harm occurs, tf the unknowingly justified actor 
is to be held liable, the liability is analogous to that of the attempter who 
thinks he is committing an offense, only to be surprised to find out that 
he is not. 
C. Unknowing Just~ation as a Legally Impossible Attempt 
The propriety of viewing the unknowingly justified actor as an instance 
of impossible attempt is confirmed by the fact that such an actor dearly 
comes within the language of modern attempt provisions. He dearly 
would be liable for attempt under sections 25 and 26 of the Israeli Penal 
Law. Similarly, Model Penal Code section 5.01(1)(a) provides: "A 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind 
of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he 
purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the 
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be . . . .  ,,2s Under 
the circumstances as Ashkenazi believed them to be, he is liable for theft. 
The harm that normally flows from a theft is outweighed in this instance 
by the benefit derived because of the justifying circumstances. To hold 
Ashkenazi liable for theft, as the reasons theory would do, is to ignore 
this central fact. The existence of resulting net harm does matter. 
Nonetheless, Ashkenazi has the culpable state of mind required for theft 
and has shown his willingness to act upon it. These are the central 
characteristics of and rationale for punishing an impossible attempter, 
and Ashkenazi accordingly deserves to be held liable for attempt. 
To deny the status of the unknowingly justified actor as an 
impossible attempter, and the strength of the conceptual analogy between 
the two, creates a challenge for reasons theorists. They must argue that 
the fortuitous lack of harm that undercuts an offense element-- the 
shooter misses because the intended shooting victim bends down just as 
the trigger is squeezed--ought to reduce the offense grade to that of an 
attempt, but that the fortuitous lack of a net harm in a justification 
case--Ashkenazi's theft saves lives--ought not reduce the grade to that 
28 Model Penal Code ~ 5.01(1)(a). 
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of  an attempt. On  what grounds could such a dist inct ion--between the 
absence of  a harm and the absence of  a net h a r m - - b e  defended? 
George Fletcher argues that there is an important difference 
between violating an offense norm and violating a justification norm; this 
is the theme of his response to my paper on the subject of  twenty years 
ago. 29 I concede that the two certainly are different. Fletcher's argu- 
ments in this respect are persuasive, but then few would disagree with 
the claim that offenses are concepomily distinct from justification 
defenses. 3° What  Fletcher must show is why the difference between 
offense rules and justification rules are different in a way that drives us 
to deviate from our general rule that the presence of  resulting harm 
ought to increase liability over that of  an unsuccessful attempt to cause 
it. I find nothing in his analysis that addresses this central point. 
To put the offense-justification distinction in a factual context, 
consider the following two cases. The actor believes a wind storm is 
coming but ignores the risk and burns a field's harvest stubble (a com- 
mon practice by farmers as a low-cost way to increase the fertility of the 
ground) despite the likelihood that the wind storm will cause the fire he 
sets to spread to a nearby town. It turns out that the actor is wrong 
about the wind storm. There never existed any danger to the nearby 
town, at least no more than the usual no wind storm stubble burning 
creates. Is the actor guilty of reckless endangerment because he mis- 
takenly believed that he was creating an unlawfifl danger? I think most 
would say no--reckless endangerment requires proof of  a real, not just 
an imagined unreasonable, risk of harm. 31 At most, the actor could be 
liable for attempted reckless endangerment, provided such an offense were 
,-9 George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robin- 
sort 23 U.C.LA. L Rev. 293, 308-18 (1975). 
so There are some important exceptions to this, however, at least among English 
writers. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 138 (2d ed. 1983). 
3~ Model Penal Code § 211.2, Reckless Endangerment, provides in part:. "A 
person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may 
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury." Thus if an actor does 
not fully extinguish a campfire, which in turn causes a forest fire to ignite and places a 
nearby town in imminent danger, the actor will be found guilty of reckless endangerment. 
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recognized. 32 
Now assume the same actor malidously bums his neighbor's 
cornfield, but the burning serves as a firebreak to an oncoming forest fire 
about which he did not know. The burning ends up saving the nearby 
town and is, therefore, justified on the objective facts; in other words, a 
standard unknowingly justified actor case. I would argue, by analogy to 
the case above, that the actor ought not be held liable for the full 
offensewthat is, he ought to get a justification defense--because no net 
harm occurred. He could be held liable for an attempt, unjustifiably to 
burn the field (there is no justifying good that comes from his 
externalized intention unjustifiably to bum the field). If  the absence of 
real danger means the stubble-burner can be punished only for his 
externalized culpable intention (as an attempt), how, in the absence of 
any net harm, can the cornfield-burner who saved the town be punished 
for more than h/s externaliTed culpable intention (as an attempt)? 
Note that Professor Fletcher's claim that the issue should be re- 
solved differently in the justification context than in the offense defini- 
tion context runs into some practical difficulty in modern codes. The 
Model Penal Code defines recklessness (and negligence) in a way that 
incorporates the concept ofjustiflcation: it is criminal to disregard a risk 
(or, in the case of negligence, to be unaware of a risk of which a reason- 
able person would be aware) that is "substantial and unjustzanea." .,, -,,33 Thus, 
the application of statutes requiring recklessness or negligence requires an 
assessment of the justification of the risk, making it impossible toisolate 
justifications for special treatment apart from offense definitions. 
IV. F_aMPIRICAL DATA ON COMMUNITY VIEWS 
OF THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIFIED ACTOR 
Those opposed to a deeds theory of justification often offer intuitive 
notions of justice in support of their position, while those in support do 
32 I have argued elsewhere that it should be. Paul H. Robinson, A Funct/ona/ 
Analysis of CriminalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L Rev. 857, 88%96 (1994). 
33 Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)-(d). 
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the same, but suggesting a different intuitive notion of justice. ~4 Such 
claims, and disagreements, are common in criminal law theory and until 
recently often marked a dead-end in the debate. But social science has 
developed research techniques that can reliably resolve such disputes, that 
can determine the community view on any of a variety of such questions, 
as well as measure the extent of community agreement or disagreement. 
A study was recently completed that tested, among other things, the 
specific claim in dispute here: the community view of liability for the 
unknowingly justified actor. 
In this space it would be impossible to recount the details of 
such research methods or to document their reliability. For a full 
discussion, the reader is referred to the studies themselves. 35 Generally, 
the method used to probe subjects' moral intuitions is the "scenario" or 
"vignette method." Subjects are presented with a short description of a 
person's conduct and are asked whether and, if so, how much liability 
and punishment the actor should receive for the conduct. Subjects next 
are given another scenario, and assess liability and punishment for that 
actor, then another scenario, and so on. The scenarios are varied by the 
researchers in ways suggested by the theories being tested, and the 
patterning of liabilities assigned each scenario provides differential 
support for the competing theories. 
In this study, subjects were given scenarios that included the 
situations described in the first column of the table below. The second 
column gives the mean of the subjects' liability judgments from a 13- 
point scale: a "no liability" option and twelve liability choices, 0 through 
11, each with an increasing amount of punishment. Specifically, the 
subjects were given the following penalty scale: N (no liability) --~ 0 
(liability but no punishment) --> 1 (1 day) --> 2 (2 weeks) --> 3 (2 months) 
--> 4 (6 months) --> 5 (1 year) --~ 6 (3 years) --> 7 (7 years) ---> 8 (15 years) 
--> 9 (30 years) --> 10 (life) -~ 11 (death). 
E$, George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Crinu'na/Law 555-56 (1978); 2 Robinson, 
supra note 3, at 24. 
3s The specific findings reported here appear in Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
Darley, Testing Competing Theories of fusnfication (submitted for publication; draft 
available from the author). The research method is discussed at length in Robinson & 
Darley, supra note 18, app. A. 
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The last column of the table translates the liability mean into the 
corresponding term of imprisonment. The study involved a variety of 
related issues. I focus here on just those scenarios that speak to the 
unknowingly justified actor dispute. 
Liability Means 
SCENARIO LIABIHTY MEAN IMPRISONMENT 
EQUIVAr.FNT 
Control Cases 
1. intentional 4.65 
(unjustified) 
burning 
2. attempted (un- 3.52 
justified) burning 
6. intentional 0.57 
justified burning 
Test Cases 
- 10 months 
- 4 months 
essentially no 
punishment 
7. unknowingly 
justified burning 
8. knowingly 
justified burning 
with bad motive 
3.63 - 4 months 
2.10 - 2 weeks 
Scenario 1, a control case of an intentional burning with no 
claim of justification, has a liability mean of 4.65 (equivalent to about 
10 months' imprisonment). 36 This is what one might expect given the 
The translations from liability means to imprisonment terms axe taken from the 
table in Robinson & Darley, supra note 18, at 283. 
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nature of the offense, a property offense in which no risk m persons is 
created. 
Scenario 2, another control case, is an unsuccessful attempt to 
cause the harm actually caused in scenario 1. The liability assigned by 
the subjects is 3.52 (just over 4 months). This is consistent with other 
published research, which found substantially reduced punishment based 
solely on the fortuitous absence of the intended harm. Indeed, the ratio 
of penalties between scenarios 1 and 2 is consistent with those jurisdic- 
tions that set the grade of an attempt as one grade less than, or at half 
the penalty of, the substantive offense. 37 (On the exponential penalty 
scale used in the study, one unit is equivalent to one offense grade in a 
typical modem American criminal code, and each higher grade typically 
doubles the penalty of the previous grade.) 
Scenario 6, another control case, is an intentional justified 
burning. As expected, it received essentially no punishment. Its liability 
mean was 0.57. Among the subjects 38.5 percent gave no liability. An- 
other 40.4 percent gave liability but no punishment. The remaining 
21.2 percent gave punishment ranging from 1 day to 1 year. This 
baseline is not as low as one might have guessed but still reflects the pre- 
dicted judgment that the vast majority of subjects see the case as one of 
little or no blameworthiness, despite the fact that an intentional harm is 
caused. 
Turning to the test scenarios, scenario 7, presenting the un- 
knowingly justified actor, confirms the predictions of the deeds theory. 
The perpetrator in scenario 7 receives a liability mean of 3.63 (just over 
4 months). This is not statistically different from the attempt control 
case in scenario 2, as the deeds theory predicts. Such liability is 
dramatically less than the 4.65 liability (about 10 months) for the 
substantive offense that the reasons theory predicts. The deeds theory 
is dearly more consistent with community views on this matter. 
(Scenario 8 presents the case of the actor who knows of the justi- 
fying circumstances but who acts for other, nonjustificatory motives. 
Recall that current law would give a complete defense in such a 
case--the actor "believes" in the justifying circumstances but is not 
37 See the statutes listed in Paul H. Robinson, Fundamenta/s of CriminalLaw 297 
(2d eck 1995). 
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motivated by them--although logic would seem to suggest that a strict 
reasons theory would give no defense. The liability mean is 2.10 (2.6 
weeks), not the complete defense that current law would provide--only 
7.8 percent of our subjects assigned a verdict of no liability--and not 
the filll liability that the reasons theory logically would seem to suggest. 
It is consistent, however, with the deeds theory prediction of liability of 
somewhat less than that of the unknowingly justified actor. The actor 
is entitled to at least the discount given the unknowingly justified actor 
because his act is objectively justified; a greater harm in fact is avoided. 
Unlike the unknowingly justified actor, however, this actor's liability for 
attempt is less dear. His knowledge of the justifying circumstances may 
suggest to him that his conduct is not in fact criminal; thus he has not 
the clear intention to violate the law that the unknowingly justified actor 
has. He might be viewed less as breaking the law than as taking 
advantage of it. In any case, the results again are consistent with the 
deeds view and inconsistent with the reasons view.) 
V. LIABIHTY FOR RESISTING AN 
UNKNOWINGLY J U ~ D  ACTOR 
Beyond the issue of liability for the unknowingly justified actor, the 
competing theories of justification have implications for the lawfulness 
of resisting the unknowingly justified actor. Assume the terrorist in the 
Ashkenazi case is watching his planted backpack from a distance, waiting 
to see the bomb go off and the resulting mayhem. He sees Ashkenazi 
steal the bag and confronts him, demanding its return. Can the terrorist 
or an accomplice lawfully use force against Ashkenazi to regain control 
of the bag? In other words, should one be able lawfiflly to resist a 
person who one knows is an unknowingly justified actor? 
Under the deeds theory, Ashkenazi's conduct is justified, and 
therefore the terrorist cannot lawfully resist it. But the reasons theory 
makes the actual justified nature of the deed irrelevant. Because he acts 
for the wrong reason, the unknowingly justified actor is not justified. 
He is acting "unlawfully," which traditionally creates a right lawfully to 
resist the conduct. Yet logic tells us here again that reasons theory gives 
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improper results. 3s Whether the deed is or is not act3,=lly justified ought 
to be central to whether the law authorizes resistance to it. 39 
An analysis of the statutory provisions confirms these results: the 
reasons-based Model Penal Code would give the terrorist a right forcibly 
to resist Ashkenazi's taking; the deeds-based Draft Criminal Code of  
England and Wales would not. 
Because Ashkenazi does not have the "belief" required for a 
justification, his theft, even though it is necessary to save the people on 
the beach, is not "justified" under the Model Penal Code. 4° Under  the 
code, an actor can interfere with conduct that is "unlawful. ''41 (Israeli 
Penal Law section 34J has a similar requirement that defensive conduct 
is permitted only against "unlawful" attack.) Is Ashkenazi's unjustified 
conduct "unlawful"? Model Penal Code section 3.11(1) defines 
"unlawful force" as: " f o r c e . . .  w h i c h . . ,  would constitute [an] offense 
• . .  except for a defense . . .  not amounting to a privilege to use the 
force." Ashkenazi has no defense to his theft; he will in fact be held 
fully liable for it under the Model Penal Code. Thus, his theft is 
"unlawful" and, therefore, the terrorist lawfully can resist his taking 
under the code, even though he (the terrorist) knows of the justifying 
facts! In other words, even the contorted definition of  "unlawful force" 
in section 3.11(1) does not save the Model Penal Code from improper 
results. In the context of  the unknowingly justified actor, the code's 
reasons formulation of  justification has a real and a detrimental effect. 
While its effect is likely inadver tent- - i t  is hard to believe that the 
~s The reasons advocate might argue that the terrorist is not justified in interfering 
because he does not have the proper justificatory purpose; he knows what Ashkenazi does 
not, that the bag contains a deadly bomb. But the doctrine they have created would 
describe the terrorist's conduct and state of mind as resisting an "unjustified" theft, which 
surely a person is authorized to do. Immediately following in the text is an analysis of 
the reasons theory statutory formulations that shows just this conclusion. Once the 
reasons advocate strips the unknowingly justified actor of the protection of being 
"justified," it becomes difficult in resurrecting that privilege to avoid resistance by others. 
39 If the resister were unaware of the justifying circumstances, of course she may 
be entided to an excuse for mistaken justification. 
~0 Model Penal Code § 3.02. 
4, Id § 3.06. 
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drafters actually intended such a result--i t  demonstrates the dangers of 
constructing a code using the reasons approach. 
Note that the Draft Criminal Code for England and Wales 
avoids this error by providing an objective form of justification. 
Whether the terrorist lawfully may interfere with Ashkenazi's theft under 
the proposed code depends upon whether Ashkenazi's theft is "unlawful," 
as defined by section 44(3). Ashkenazi would have a defense to his theft 
under section 44(1)(c); 42 the circumstances exist that make his theft 
necessary to protect others even though he does not know of those 
circumstances. But his defense will not be one of those enumerated in 
section 44(3), situations in which, despite resulting in an acquittal, the 
conduct nonetheless is held to be "unlawful." Ashkenazi's defense is not 
that he thought his theft was necessary, as would be relevant under 
section 44(1)(c), for example, but rather that his theft was in fact 
necessary. Therefore, his conduct is not "unlawful" under section 44(3) 
and, therefore, the terrorist cannot lawfully resist i t - - t he  proper result. 43 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The deeds and reasons theories give different results for both an 
unknowingly justified actor and a person resisting such an actor. The 
reasons theory gives no defense to an unknowingly justified actor; thus 
full liability. The deeds theory gives a justification defense, but the 
unknowingly justified actor nonetheless is liable for an impossible 
42 "A person does not commit an offense by using such force as, in the circum- 
stances which exist or which he believes to exist, is immediately necessary and reasonable 
•. .  (c) to protect himself or another from unlawfiA force or unlawful personal harm.. 
• ." Draft Code, supra note 8, § 44(1)(c). 
43 Ashkenazi may be liable for an impossible attempt under ~ ~§ 49-50, and his 
conduct might be considered "unlawful" for the purposes of/d § 44 on this ground, 
which would give the wrong result of allowing the terrorist lawfully to intervene. But 
this difficulty with the Draft Code could be fixed with minor changes by making dear 
that the right to use force depends upon the "unlawfulness" of the actual conduct, not 
the conduct mistakenly envisioned in the mind of the person being defended against. 
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attempt in most modern code jurisdictions. The deeds approach, then, 
generates the proper result, a conclusion confirmed by the empirical 
study showing that lay persons see the unknowingly justified actor as 
liable at the reduced attempt level, not at the level of fifll substantive 
liability that the reasons theory would provide. 
The two theories also give different liability results for a person 
who resists an unknowingly justified actor. The reasons theory, having 
concluded that the unknowingly justified actor's conduct is unjustified, 
allows a person lawfully to resist the justified conduct. This is the result 
tinder the Model Penal Code, but surely it is the wrong result (and may 
not have been intended by the drafters) for it allows a person lawfully to 
engage in conduct that the person knows to be against society's interest. 
The deeds theory, in contrast, properly denies a defense to one who 
resists one he knows to be an unknowingly justified actor. 44 
These liability results, together with the labeling advantages of 
the deeds theory in distinguishing objective justification from subjective, 
mistaken justification, 45 suggest that justification theory and law ought 
44 Russell Christopher challenges the deeds theory by offering this hypothetical: 
assume two unknowingly justified actors, each of whom is about to attack the other for 
malicious reasons, unaware that their attacks are in fact objectively justified. Both acts 
would seem to be justified under the deeds theory, Christopher argues, which is not 
possible. My analysis would be to find that each actor is justified (to the extent that his 
conduct is in fact necessaryfbr defense, which may require an impossible manipulation of 
the facts--but assume such would be possible). Does this conclusion create a problem 
for the deeds theory? I think not. It is normally true that for two actors in combat only 
one is justified; either one's conduct or the other's creates a net harm, not both. But the 
point of this hypothetical is to superimpose two justification situations on top of one 
another. But this does not alter our assessment of each of the attacks and the response 
to it. Both initial attacks are unjustified; both defenses to the attacks are justified; both 
actors are liable for attempt for their unknowingly justified use of force. In each instance, 
the deeds theory wants to announce that such conduct (the unknowingly justified 
defensive conduct) is justified under such circumstances (because of the original 
unjustified attack) for similar actors in similar situations in the future. (One might even 
argue that both actors are liable for assault based upon their original unjustified attacks. 
If the attacks start simultaneously, at their origin both are aggressive, rather than 
defensive, and therefore not justified. This analysis, however, would not support liability 
for any resulting injury, because the later conduct causing injury would have occurred 
after the unjustified attack began and therefore would be unknowingly justified.) 
~5 See supra text accompanying and follo~ng note 17. 
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to follow a deeds theory rather than the reasons theory currendy more 
popular. 46 
What is the implication of the reasons-deeds dispute for Motti 
Ashkenazi? Because of the lives saved by his actions, the police decide 
not to charge Ashkenazi in the theft, and allow him an easy plea bargain 
in another case pending against him. Ashkenazi becomes a bit of a hero 
in Tel Aviv. 
On the other hand, there is criticism of the police and prosecu- 
tors for letting him off easy. He becomes a bit of a comic hero. He is 
lampooned on a late-night talk show for his "good deed." The talk show 
Some writers, such as Fletcher, have urged a dual requirement: that the actor 
both perform the right deed and act for the right reason. I find such a dual requirement 
pu~ling. I understand the theory behind the reasons approach: a justification defense 
ought to depend upon whether the actor thought he was justified; many theorists believe 
that an actor's externalized culpable state of mind ought to be the sole criterion for 
criminal liability. I also understand, and support, the theory behind the deeds approach: 
that the defense ought to depend upon the absence of a net resulting harm; no net harm 
renders the unknowingly justified actor an impossible attempter, who, like any at-tempter, 
deserves less liability than one who actually brings about the harm or evil of the 
substantive offense. I do not, however, understand the theory behind this dual require- 
ment approach. It seems internally inconsistent in its view on the significance of result- 
ing harm and on the sufficiency of culpability as grounds for full liability. How would 
one articulate the general theory of liability behind requiting both the fight reason and 
the right deed? Is the absence of a net harm significant or not? Is externalized cul- 
pability suffident for full substantive liability or not? Apparendy, the answer to these 
questions is different in different s i tua t ions -  mistakenly justified and unknowingly 
justified - -  but k is not apparent why the answers to such questions should depend on 
the factual situation. 
Even if one could articulate a theory for the dual requirement, it would not 
necessarily answer the many objections to the reasons theory, for it too denies a defense 
to and thereby imposes full liability on the unknowingly jusffied actor. To review, a 
reasons theory denies the significance of the analogy between the unknowingly justified 
actor and the impossible attempter. That is, by denying a defense to the unknowingly 
justified actor, it treats him as indistinguishable from the actor with a similar culpable 
state of mind who is not objectively justified. The dual requirement approach would do 
the same. Further, the reasons theory, by denying a justification to the unknowingly 
justified actor, authorizes others lawfully to resist that objectively justified conduct. Thus, 
because the unknowingly justified actor is treated as unjustified, even one who knows of 
the jusfififing circumstances can lawfully resist him. The dual requirement approach 
suffers the same defect. 
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host envisions a drugged out Ashkenazi invited to meet the president and 
reimbursed for the income he lost when the backpack did not contain 
valuables. The conflicting feelings about the Ashkenazi case are under- 
standable. 
Under a deeds theory, Ashkenazi's conduct is recognized as 
beneficial, and it is given a legal status reflecting that benefit: it is 
justified, and therefore beyond lawful interference by others. Much of 
the expressed public admiration for what Ashkenazi did bespeaks this 
feeling. 
But the deeds theory also draws an important distinction 
between Ashkenazi's conduct, which is admirable, and his motivation, 
which is reprehensible. The deeds theory would privilege the conduct 
against interference but would impose liability and punishment on 
Ashkenazi for his demonstrated willingness to commit what he thought 
was an unjustified theft. While the terrorist could not lawfully interfere 
with him, Ashkenazi himself would be liable for attempted theft. 
While public admiration for Ashkenazi's deed can easily spill over 
to admiration for the man, it ought to be resisted. There is societal 
value in publicly admiring the conduct, for it signals to all that such 
conduct would be encouraged in the future, even would be thought of 
as heroic. But there is also societal value in making clear that Ashkenazi 
himself is to be condemned, for it is only in this way that the norm 
against theft can be unambiguously reinforced. 
By defining justifications subjectively, the reasons theory obscures 
this key distinction: it allows the law to announce only whether an actor  
is "justified"; it allows the law no mechanism by which it can announce 
the character of the act. The deeds theory, in contrast, highlights the 
distinction between the act and the actor. Ashkenazi's act may be 
praised, while Ashkenazi is condemned. 
The reasons theory also misses the mark when it sees Ashkenazi 
as no different from other thieves, and thus liable for full substantive 
liability. Ashkenazi and other thieves are  different, as different as are an 
attempted murderer and a murderer. The latter has caused a net harm; 
the former has only tried to. One may hope that, if exposed to the 
deeds theory of justification--and its implication that Ashkenazi is prop- 
erly treated as an attempter--reason theory supporters may find the 
deeds view more appealing. 
